

Building the capacity for local government innovation
Draft for Peer Review

MARK EVANS
with Chris Aulich, Anne Howard and Megan Peterson¹



¹ Professor and Director of the ANZSOG Institute for Governance; email mark.evans@canberra.edu.au

Contents

i.	Sighting shots	3
ii.	What is the case for public value management?	6
iii.	What do we mean by public value innovation?	11
iv.	Case studies in public value creation	14
	<i>Strategic innovations</i>	14
	<i>Product innovations</i>	22
	<i>Service innovations</i>	25
	<i>Governance innovations</i>	29
v.	Practical lessons from the case studies	38
vi.	What are the major barriers to innovation?	40
vii.	How can they be navigated?	42
	References	43

Like any human venture, government can be full of error, fallibility and hubris. But the bigger danger for governments today is not excessive hubris but rather that they might succumb to the myth—often propagated by a sceptical media—that they are powerless, condemned to mistrust and futility. If they do so succumb, they will fail to rise to the great challenges, from climate change to inequality, that they alone can tackle.

Geoff Mulgan, Director, Young Foundation.

I. Sighting shots

There are a number of key international drivers which are prompting local governments across the world to re-consider the way they organise themselves, manage service delivery, work with stakeholders, engage with citizens and hold themselves accountable. These drivers can be summarised as: changes in community requirements of local government; changes in community attitudes towards local government; changing central government expectations of local government; and, the changing nature of local government work including the emergence of new partners in local governance. Of course these drivers are not confined to local government but have had a significant impact on all levels of Australian government.

Indeed the Rudd government's decision to establish an Advisory Group on the Reform of Australian Government Administration (RAGA) in 2010, was testimony to its commitment to engage in a further process of administrative modernisation to meet the challenges of 'increasing complexity, increasing public expectations, demographic change, technological change, globalisation, financial pressures and workforce planning and retention'. The Gillard government has continued to pursue this agenda although with a limited funding base. It is arguable that in combination the Australian Centre for Excellence in Local Government's (ACELG) six programs are aimed at responding to similar pressures [research and policy foresight; innovation and better practice; governance and strategic leadership; organisation capacity building; rural-remote and indigenous local government; and, workforce development] to enhance the knowledge base, leadership and capacity of local government in an era of governance.

At the same time the Australian public services have entered a difficult phase in their institutional development. The global financial crisis, public sector borrowing requirements and the need to pay for various fiscal stimulus packages, and the incremental impacts of demographic change have helped to usher in an era of austerity. The governing rhetoric underpinning this process has oscillated between 'slash and burn' and the need for 'governance innovation'.

Drawing on domestic and international evidence, we pose two main arguments in this guide as the basis for discussion and professional reflection. Firstly, while New Public Management (NPM) instruments remain important tools within the public management toolkit they are no longer sufficient to meet the challenge of public service provision in an era of governance. This is because NPM tends to privilege the role of public servants as the arbiter of the common good, NPM

takes the politics out of public policy deliberation and its market orientation is at odds with the concept of public service sitting more easily with the language of the consumer rather the language of the citizen. In consequence, the success of local government reform rests on the development of citizen-centred governance underpinned by the concept of public value. This is the 'Big Idea' both to lend principles, form and clarity to the local government reform process and to confront integrity challenges. Secondly, the establishment of a culture of public value innovation is central to the achievement of this aim. By public value innovation we refer to the creation and implementation of new products, services and methods of delivery through collaboration with citizens and stakeholders which result in positive social and economic outcomes for the citizenry. So the emphasis here is on engaging directly with both citizens and stakeholders.

In the discussion which follows we will draw on data derived from several ongoing Australian, New Zealand, US and European research programs on public sector governance and innovation to evaluate the following questions:²

- Why public value management?
- What do we mean by public value innovation?
- What does it look like in practice?
- What are the major barriers to public value innovation in local government?³
- How are these barriers best navigated?

In conclusion, it is argued that the following factors are central to the creation of a culture of public sector innovation:

Principles of engagement

1. Search for public value.
2. Every idea matters.
3. Innovation involves everybody.
4. Create interdisciplinary teams with effective disciplinary integration.
5. Stakeholder and citizen participation is important at all stages.
6. Experiment – question received wisdom and search widely for ideas.

2 These include: the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard University; the UK's Improvement and Development Agency *Innovation in Public Services* project; *Involve* a London based think tank specialising in citizens engagement; the *Publin Innovation Project* funded by the European Union's 5th Framework Project. See also: Mulgan, G. and Albury, D. (2003), *Innovation in the Public Sector*, London, Strategy Unit/ Cabinet Office; Evans (PAC/NSG) (2010), *Why does government find it so hard to be strategic?* London, PAC/NSG; Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA) (2005), *Innovation in Public Services*, <http://www.idea.gov.uk/idk/aio/1118552> (accessed 3 February 2010); and, NESTA Making Innovations Flourish, <http://www.nesta.org.uk/home> (accessed 3 February 2010).

3 For recent developments on policy innovation in Commonwealth government in Australia see the ANAO's recent (2009) *Better Practice Guide – Innovation in the Public Sector*, available at: <http://www.apo.org.au/research/innovation-public-sector-better-practice-guide>

Leading innovation

7. Mayors and CEOs must champion innovation from the top.
8. Innovation requires resources [e.g. ring fenced funding/internal and community award schemes].
9. Innovation champions should be formally identified and organised at all levels of the organisation using performance appraisal schemes.
10. Rewards must be invested in innovative individuals and teams.
11. To access knowledge develop high quality knowledge networks which encompass theory and practice and include governance partners.

Maintaining a culture of innovation

12. Design the workplace in a way that is conducive to the development of and incubation of new ideas.
13. Invest in research and development to identify, incubate, develop and trial new ideas.
14. Invest in innovation coaching and mentoring.
15. Develop regular lesson-drawing forums and other mediums for communicating success stories and identifying potential innovations.
16. Use monitoring and evaluation processes as an ongoing condition for effective learning.
17. Embrace cyclical external evaluations and other practices which allow for genuine professional reflection.

ii. What is the case for public value management?




Figure 1. Mark Moore's Strategic Triangle

Although NPM instruments remain important tools within the public management toolkit they are no longer sufficient to meet the challenge of public service provision in an era of governance. This is because NPM tends to privilege the role of public servants as the arbiter of the common good, NPM takes the politics out of public policy deliberation and its market orientation is at odds with the concept of public service sitting more easily with the language of the consumer rather the language of the citizen. The introduction of "employment at whim" (contract employment, associated with varying degrees of precariousness), and the corresponding erosion of public service ethics and institutional memory are evident manifestations of the hollowing-out of 'government by the rules'. An integrity paradox has emerged in which in certain instances the quest for economy, efficiency and effectiveness through NPM, governance, and risk management, has increased rather than reduced the scope for maladministration and corruption. In consequence, the success of local government reform rests on the development of inclusive governance structures which can meet the demands of both representative democracy and the efficient delivery of public services.

Many of the obstacles to representative and responsive governance identified in the burgeoning literature on governance can be overcome through the

reformation of governance norms, values and operational rules aimed at achieving public value (see Evans, 2009). From the research findings outlined in the governance literature, it is possible to identify the key problems confronting public managers in an era of governance. These include: the problem of steering networks of local and non-governmental organizations outside traditional organizational boundaries; the absence of operational rules (e.g. establishing lines of command through, for example, the establishment of publicly-driven performance targets); the limited policy instruments for managing governance performance (e.g. monitoring and evaluation systems); the dangers of governance structures being subject to interest capture and the consequent risk of their ability to resist and/or dilute government aims; and, associated problems of weak democratic control and confused accountabilities.

As Table 2 illustrates, the emergence of public value management is a direct response to the shift from government to governance and the limits of NPM in managing its inherent problems. This refers to the move away from governmental organisations being the sole provider of services to systems of collaboration with private and third sector actors.

Table 2. Changing administrative culture

New public management	Public value management
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Informed by private sector management techniques • Services delivered more flexibly with more managerial autonomy & tailored to the requirements of consumers • Enabling ('steering') • Certain services to be delivered through collaborative partnerships with public, private and voluntary sectors • Service delivery audited to measure economy, efficiency and effectiveness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The overarching goal is achieving public value that in turn involves greater effectiveness in tackling the problems that the public most care about: stretches from service delivery to system maintenance • Public managers play an active role in steering networks of deliberation and delivery • Individual and public preferences are produced through a process of deliberative reflection over inputs and opportunity costs • No one sector has a monopoly on public service ethos; shared values is seen as essential • Emphasis on the role of politics in allocating public goods

Mark Moore (1995), who coined the phrase 'public value management' (PVM), basically argues that public services can add value to society in the same way that private for-profit organisations create value for their shareholders and other stakeholders. By implication, public intervention should be circumscribed by the need to achieve positive social and economic outcomes for the citizenry. What is and what is not public value should be determined collectively through inclusive deliberation involving elected and appointed government officials, key stakeholders and the public. Conceptually the notion of public value resonates with other modernisation discourses that seek to address the limits of the liberal


democratic model in meeting the requisite needs of the citizenry such as the New Localism (Aldridge & Stoker 2002 & Goss, 2001), social capital (Putnam, 1995; Cabinet Office, 2002) and deliberative democracy (Fischer 1993 & 2003; Parkinson 2004).

In the same way that in 1995 Christopher Hood identified the emergence of an international NPM movement, a similar observation can be made with regard to PVM in the new millennium. A small number of centrist UK think tanks such as the IPPR, the Work Foundation, Demos, Involve and the Young Foundation have adopted public value as their modernisation concept of choice for reinvigorating the public sector and bringing it closer to the people.⁴ In addition, several state centred public value projects have emerged in Australia (e.g. the National Office of the Information Economy), Germany (e.g. the Civil Service commission and the 'Red Tape' movement), and, France (e.g. the Ministry of State Transformation and the French decentralisation process). Moreover, civil/public service training organisations such as the Australia-New Zealand School of Government, the Kennedy School at Harvard, the China Academy of Governance and the National School of Government in the UK have all begun to integrate the concept of public value into their executive training courses.

There have already been several governmental flirtations with the concept of public value. For example, in the UK during the Blair premiership following the publication of *Creating Public Value* by Gavin Kelly and Stephen Muers in the Strategy Unit in 2002 several high profile government spokespeople included references to achieving public value in policy papers and public lectures (see Balls, 2002; Blunkett, 2003a&b & 2004, Raynsford, 2003 and Turnbull 2002). Indeed, according to the Work Foundation several British public organisations have operated public value assessment frameworks since 2006 including the BBC, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the Victoria and Albert Museum, and several local authority recycling schemes such as the London Borough of Lewisham. However, on closer inspection it is evident that public value experiments tend to be characterised by different models of decision-making underpinned by different conceptions of democracy and reflecting different modes of public engagement. Figure 2 situates these models of decision-making along a continuum in which 'bottom-up' deliberative decision-making and 'top-down' 'government-knows best' consultative forms of decision-making can be found at each end of the spectrum. The further you move towards the deliberative end of the continuum, the greater the ability of the citizen to affect policy outcomes.

4 For example, for the Work Foundation see: <http://theworkfoundation.com/products/publicvalue.aspx> [accessed 3 October 2009] and for the IPPR see: <http://www.ippr.org.uk/research/teams/project.asp?id=876&pid=876> [accessed 3 October 2009].

Figure 2. The scope of public involvement in public value decision-making



But what are the implications of PVM for public service reform? As Gerry Stoker (2006:16) observes, the public value paradigm demands a commitment to broader goals than those envisaged under traditional and NPM management regimes as managers are tasked with steering networks of deliberation and delivery as well as maintaining the overall coherence of the system. It offers a different narrative of reform in the sense that it centres:

...on a fuller and rounder vision of humanity than either traditional or NPM. People are, it suggests, motivated by their involvement in networks and partnerships, by their relationships with others formed in the context of equal status and mutual learning. Some will find its vision attractive but the realists or cynics may prefer to stick with traditional public management or NPM.

Hence PVM reform would require new values and practices and in certain instances the rediscovery of old ones; for example, the notion of public service.


The obstacles to the effective application of PVM in Westminster models of representative democracy have been well documented elsewhere and include: professional and parliamentary resistance and path dependency; the lack of political will; resource constraints; and, issues of complexity (see: Gains and Stoker 2009 & Rhodes and Wanna, 2007). The notion of public value, so the argument goes, doesn't sit easily with the Westminster model as it introduces a concept of public interest that is not determined by the government of the day, but by public servants in consultation with communities and providers. These factors, amongst others, have led Francesca Gains and Gerry Stoker (2009: 2) to conclude that, 'this new "public service contract" is likely to be easier to adopt in a local setting than in the core executive although in neither case is the adoption of new modes of working between politicians, officials and citizens unproblematic'.

However, radical times require a radical rethink. The evidence suggests that presently governance has failed to transform itself into anything other than 'the acceptable face of spending cuts' (Stoker, 1998: 1) and is far from an efficient mode of governing. Moreover, evaluations of performance in government bemoan: the absence of citizen involvement in service delivery; low productivity

and inefficiency; restricted choice and poor outcomes for the disadvantaged; the minimal spreading of best practice and innovation; and limited government responsiveness to public opinion (see, amongst others, Bichard, 2005). In sum, NPM is simply unequal to the task of managing public service production.

There are three potential new theatres for PVM which further bolster its claims to being both philosophically and practically attune with the needs of the citizenry. Firstly, it would be possible to circumvent criticisms that PVM would undermine the power of elected representatives through the introduction of delegated decision-making on a devolved model operating within framework agreements established by the government of the day. Secondly, a public value approach could be integrated into a Comprehensive Performance Assessment process. Public service agreements could be established in high politics by the government of the day and Specially Responsible Officers accountable for delivering government priorities would then be required to call a public into being through the creation of public service juries with the task of monitoring and evaluating government performance alongside public servants and elected representatives. Public service juries would operate on the same basis as the criminal jury system. *We trust citizens to make life and death decisions why not public value ones?* Thirdly, the international case study evidence tells us that PVM is particularly effective in societies characterised by economic crisis or where government is suffering from low esteem due to the fall-out from corruption scandals or other forms of maladministration. In such circumstances PVM is a crucial policy instrument for both social stabilisation and trust-building between local governments and their communities.

III. What do we mean by public value innovation and how do we know it when we've got it?



By public value innovation we refer to the creation and implementation of new products, services and methods of delivery through collaboration with citizens and stakeholders which result in positive social and economic outcomes for the citizenry. So the emphasis here is on engaging directly with both citizens and stakeholders. But what do we mean by innovation? We held three focus groups with senior local government managers in Western Australia, New South Wales and the ACT to deliberate on this issue. The findings follow.

What is and what isn't innovative will of course depend on the state of development of the organisation you are looking at; innovation in one place and time maybe commonplace in another. However, as a rule of thumb we can identify degrees of innovation with regard to:

- Place – innovation means different things in different places; so how innovative is the program from the perspective of the institutions location and history?
- Novelty – the degree to which the program demonstrates a leap of creativity from existing practice.

- Significance – the degree to which the program successfully addresses an important problem of ‘public’ concern.
- Utility – the degree to which the innovation makes things easier for local governments.
- Effectiveness – the degree to which the program achieves tangible results for the citizenry.
- Longevity – the capacity of the innovation to achieve results over time.
- Transferability – the degree to which the program, or aspects of it, shows promise of inspiring successful replication by other governmental entities.

But what does it look like in practice? Table 3 overleaf provides an overview of the key public sector innovations of the past two decades reflecting the shift from traditional public administration to new public management.

There are probably as many typologies of public service innovations as there are innovations themselves but we will organise our thoughts around four types: (1) strategic innovation; (2) product innovation; (3) service innovation; and (4), governance innovation.⁵

Strategic innovations introduce new missions, worldviews, objectives, strategies and rationales which impact directly on the nature of decision-making.

Product innovation involves the development of new local government products which have a commercial or private value and are often associated with the development, use and adaptation of relevant technologies.

Service innovation involves the production of new services which have public rather than private value and sometimes draw on the development, use and adaptation of relevant technologies.

Governance innovations involve new or altered ways of solving implementation tasks with other sectors and knowledge bases, delivering services or otherwise interacting with clients for the purpose of supplying specific services.

The next section defines each form of innovation and provides illustrative case studies drawn from the Australian, New Zealand and British contexts.

⁵ See Mulgan, G. and Albury, D. (2003), *Innovation in the Public Sector*, London, Strategy Unit/Cabinet Office, for an alternative

Table 3. The four dimensions of new public management reform

<p style="text-align: center;">New Public Management – market-inspired reform</p> <p><i>Privatisation</i> of state assets, and certain services <i>Internal markets</i> - separating purchasers from providers within the Public Sector to create new markets e.g. care for the elderly <i>Performance budgeting</i> – results oriented, target driven budgeting <i>Performance Contracts and Pay-for-performance</i> – establishing performance targets (PSAs) for departments and individualised pay scales for public employees <i>Programme Review</i> – systematic analysis of costs and benefits of individual programmes <i>Compulsory Competitive Tendering</i> – services delivered by the private or voluntary sectors <i>One-stop-shops</i> – coordination of programmes through one delivery system to eliminate duplication <i>Invest to save Budgets</i> – venture capital for oiling the wheels of government</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">New Public Management – governance reform</p> <p><i>Quality Standards</i> – applying principles of quality management e.g. Citizens Charters, 'Best value' or 'Comprehensive Performance Assessments', Public Service Agreements <i>Decentralisation</i> – moving responsibility for programme delivery and delegating budgetary authority from central government to provincial or local governments or neighbourhoods or through 'total place' <i>Open Government</i> – freedom of information, E-Governance and public engagement mechanisms– e.g. Citizens Juries and other deliberative forums <i>Collaborative governance with stakeholders</i> <i>Co-production with citizens</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">New Public Management – deregulatory/regulatory reform</p> <p><i>Personnel deregulation</i> – open competition in recruitment, performance related pay and elimination of civil service controls over hiring, firing, promotion, etc. <i>Purchasing Deregulation</i> – permits individual organisations to make decisions about procurement, rather than using centralised purchasing organisations Creation of <i>new regulatory bodies</i> to supervise privatisation and collaborative governance <i>Standards in Public Life</i> – constituting effective public administration frameworks (e.g. executive machinery, departments, planning and coordinating mechanisms); the development of <i>codes of ethical practice</i> (e.g. codes of conduct, transparency, accountability, effective audit, monitoring and evaluation).</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Competence reform – increasing the capacity of public servants to act</p> <p><i>Staff audits</i> to determine what personnel is on hand; <i>getting the right people into the administration</i>, partly by stronger incentives to attract and retain them, partly by changing objectives and procedures in an effort to make the work situation more challenging and rewarding; and, establishing <i>integrated training programmes</i> through the establishment of a civil service college/schools of government and professional skills for government/occupational skills frameworks Coaching and mentoring Capability reviews</p>

IV. Case studies in public value creation⁶

©Cartoonbank.com



"All I'm saying is now is the time to develop the technology to deflect an asteroid."

1. Strategic Innovation

Strategic innovations introduce new missions, worldviews, objectives, strategies and rationales which impact directly on the nature of decision-making and how local communities are governed.

Social media and flood crisis response in the City of Brisbane

Context and Opportunity

This case study of the role of social media in managing the City of Brisbane floods crisis could be situated within the context of product or service innovation

⁶ A supplement to the ANAO's (2009) *Better Practice Guide – Innovation in the Public Sector*, has recently been produced which contains 10 case studies. The case studies are: Australian Customs and Border Protection Service's Detector Dog Program; Australian Transactions Reports and Analysis Centre; Australian Taxation Office's E-Tax Initiative; Centrelink's Concept Office; Centrelink's Place Based Services Initiative; Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation's National Research Flagships Initiative; Council of Australian Governments; Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research's VANguard E-Authentication Service; The Treasury's Standard Business Reporting; and, The Treasury's Intergenerational Report. However, although very worthy in their own right none of these cases meet the definition of public value innovation expressed above.

types. However, the case is also of particular interest to us in strategic terms. The case provides a compelling illustration of the use of ICTs in delivering broader strategic organisational goals – in this context, effective crisis management.

Information is an essential component of any strategic activity. Information is context specific and will naturally change depending on the needs of the situation. The delivery of that information is also context specific and will vary according to an audience and the way that audience prefers to receive it. Typical delivery methods include face-to-face, fixed and mobile phones, postal service, press and electronic media, and online through email and corporate websites.

Innovations in web technologies together with mobile devices such as smartphones and iPads are rapidly changing the way people communicate online. Information can now be delivered to anyone, anywhere using their mobile device. In addition, online social media technologies are allowing people to interact with that information in real time. For example, when a person receives a message they can immediately send a comment back to the sender; forward the information onto others; or create their own information and share it with their own audience or community. In other words, social media platforms are not only enabling people and organisations to engage in conversations online, one-to-one; they are also enabling scalable one-to-one conversations so that members of a community can all join in the conversation. For organisations it means members of the community can help in the delivery of the information. Social media has many other advantages as a delivery innovation for organisations, including local government authorities. For example, social media:

- provides the opportunity for immediate and broad dissemination of information that is specifically tailored to a particular audience and context;
- enables the audience and the organisation to engage in a conversation providing immediate feedback and further relevant information; and,
- is agile, simple and cheap to deliver.

Consumer behaviour is shifting rapidly as more people adopt mobile technologies. People are using social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter and other collaborative websites to stay connected with work colleagues, family and friends. A recent McKinsey study pointed to the intensity with which people are using smart phones and social media, which has increased dramatically in just the past three years.⁷

In July 2011, the British Government launched its new “Networked Nation” strategy, prepared by Martha Lane Fox, the Government’s Digital Champion. In October 2010, Lane Fox wrote: “There has been a reinvention of the Internet and the behaviour of users in the last few years. Digital services are now more

⁷ McKinsey Quarterly, July, 2011 in an article entitled: “Are your customers becoming digital junkies?” research undertaken by Bertil Chppuis, Brendan Gaffey, Parviz Parvizi showing that nearly 50 percent of US online consumers are now advanced users of smartphones, social networks, and other emerging tools—up from 32 percent in 2008.

agile, open and cheaper. To take advantage of these changes, government needs to move to a 'service culture' ..."⁸

As the flood crisis in Brisbane in January 2011 worsened and power, telephone and mobile phones were cut, Brisbane City Council (the Council) faced a situation where its usual communication channels failed. Even its corporate Website crumbled under the pressure of the unprecedented visitor numbers of people desperate for information detailing flood maps and evacuation centres. Faced with an urgent need to deliver vital factual information to its citizens, the Council turned to a new channel to communicate with those people directly affected by the floods and with the City of Brisbane more broadly.⁹ The results were outstanding.

Response

The independent inquiry which was established following the flood to review the response to the flood event, commended the Brisbane City Council for the manner in which it sought to provide the public with both general and detailed information. The Review made special mention of the Council's use of social media including Facebook and Twitter, which it said proved remarkably successful in rapidly disseminating information. The Review also noted that the increased demand for, and use of, the social media tools has continued after the flood event.

In the lead up to the peak of the flood event, the Council and the Bureau of Meteorology needed to deliver critical information to the expected 40,000 homes and businesses likely to be affected by the floods as well as to the broader Brisbane community. The Brisbane River broke its banks and the Council faced a situation where suburbs were inundated, residents and businesses displaced, power supplies, telephone lines and even mobile phones were cut, and the unprecedented volume of visitors searching online for information resulted in the failure of the Council's corporate website. In addition, the Council's offices had been evacuated and staff sent home.

The Council faced a rapidly changing situation where it was unable to deliver the vital information its citizens needed. Social media was identified as a solution for disseminating information quickly to a large number of Brisbane residents.

Working from their homes and unable to communicate via mobile phone or email, the Council's four-member Digital Communication Team turned to the Council's Facebook and Twitter accounts to deliver flood information to the community. They developed a social media campaign strategy and began engaging in conversations with citizens affected by the flood. As social media is ongoing, the Team worked around the clock, monitoring Facebook and Twitter channels for incoming inquiries and to ensure that other Twitter sources had the correct information.

8 Martha Lane Fox, Report of Strategic Review of DirectGov, October 2010, London.



9 Brisbane City Council. *Brisbane Flood January 2011*, Independent Review of Brisbane City Council's Response, 9-22 January 2011.

Part of the strategy involved developing a list of 'hot topics' to ensure that the correct information was delivered – and to ensure it was shared quickly. Council set up a public Twitter account #QLDfloods to share trusted information with other authorities, major news outlets and individuals.

It is important to note that the Council had established the Digital Communication Team more than a year prior to the flood event in the knowledge that social media was becoming an emerging communication channel. It already had a small established presence on Twitter and Facebook and a reputation for delivering credible, timely and trustworthy information. This investment by Council in establishing policies and protocols together with putting together a highly skilled and experienced social media team paid dividends as was seen with the speed with which Council was able to expertly seize the opportunity to innovate in a time of crisis.

Outcomes

Social media became the preferred communication channel during the first 48 hours of the flood event for a large number of Brisbane residents and businesses. Council saw a steep rise in the number of followers of its Twitter and Facebook pages, as indicated below:

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1,570% increase in likes - 759 increase likes to 12,679 likes - 17,546 comments - 4,641,232 post views - 21,521 views on 'Facebook Notes' - 125 Facebook Notes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 180% Increase in followers - 2,955 followers to 8,291 followers - 561 tweets sent throughout January - 2,207 re-tweets (RT) - 8,322,516 impressions - 105,306 clicks on links posted on Facebook and Twitter (bit.ly) - 7,258 total mentions <p><i>Source: Brisbane City Council, 2011</i></p>

Social media was also used to share messages from other trusted authorities as well as with traditional media. The Team worked closely with the Local Disaster Communication Centre (LDCC) as well as the Bureau of Meteorology, Queensland Police Service, Energex, State Emergency Service, Translink, and traditional media.

In addition, social media was able to engage on a one-to-one basis with those residents directly affected by the flood waters, gaining feedback and intelligence in the process, which it then immediately fed to the LDCC. This intelligent data from the public was particularly important for organising volunteers to assist with the clean-up. It also enabled Council to facilitate assistance for fellow citizens from within the community.

Using social media meant that the Team was able to communicate in real time with people not just located in Brisbane, but with concerned audiences around Australia and even around the world.

Critical success factors

The role of the Council's Digital Communications Team was critical to the Council's social media success during the flood event. The experienced Team understood the social media landscape and quickly developed and implemented a social media campaign. In addition, Council's early investment in digital communications enabled the Team to build on the protocols and policies already in place.

The Team also worked with existing communication channels. Council developed a trust-based relationship with the community by responding quickly to all requests with factually correct information in a friendly, conversational style.

This case reveals several lessons for better innovation practice: identifying the opportunity to solve a problem, preparedness to take a risk, having the ability to move quickly, understanding the market and having a commitment to the customer, and the willingness to change from past practices and procedures. Above all, they had in place a highly experienced and skilled team of professionals who understood the social media space. Brisbane City Council identified the opportunity to use social media as a solution to the failure of traditional communication channels and moved quickly to implement a social media campaign. The Council's risk levels were lowered because they already had in place a highly experienced team of digital communication professionals, adept at social media who understood the new practices and procedures required by this new channel of communication. The Team had a complete commitment to deliver information to the citizens of Brisbane and worked 24 hours a day in the early stages of the flood event.

Livability and the City of Porirua

Context and Opportunity

Porirua is a coastal city located on the far southwest corner of New Zealand's North Island, 20 km north of Wellington. As of June 2010, its population was approximately 52, 000. According to the 2006 census, the percentage of Porirua residents of European ethnicity is lower than for NZ as a whole (56.8%, compared to 67.6%), its proportion of people belonging to the Maori ethnic group is somewhat higher (20.9%, compared to 14.6%) and it has a significantly higher percentage of the ethnic group identifying as "Pacific peoples" (26.3%, compared to 7.0%). The average income for Porirua residents was approximately \$2000 higher than for NZ overall, but unexpectedly, the unemployment rate in Porirua was also slightly higher (6.9%, compared to 5.1%).

The Porirua City Council (the Council) claims to occupy a unique role among New Zealand local councils in its long-standing commitment to engaging with its

community, particularly in relation to the urban design process, having developed a forward-looking Community Strategic Plan in 2002 after extensive public consultation (www.localgovernmentmag.co.nz).

Greater emphasis was given to this general principle of engagement following the commencement of the *Local Government Act 2002* (NZ) in July 2003, with the stated purpose of providing for "democratic and effective local government that recognises the diversity of New Zealand communities" (s 3), in particular, by requiring local authorities to take steps to become more accountable to their communities and to promote their social, economic, environmental and cultural wellbeing, taking a sustainable development approach (s 3(c), (d)). Consideration of how to give effect to these objectives by the Council, gave rise to, among other things, development and implementation of a "Village Planning Programme" (VPP).

Response

One of the requirements imposed by the *Local Government Act 2002* (NZ) was for local authorities to produce a Long Term Council Community Plan (LTCCP), outlining the community's long term goals and priorities and how the council proposes to act on these, including a financial strategy, and providing a long term focus for the council's decision making.

A "Village Planning Programme" (VPP) formed part of the Council's 2004 LTCCP, and was given a budget of \$6 million to be spent over 10 years. Each year, \$100 000 is provided for planning and engagement work, \$500 000 for project delivery, with higher cost projects having to be considered in the Council's general budget or long term plan.

The overarching objectives of the VPP are to enable the Council to set a strategic direction and provide services such that the unique characteristics of Porirua's communities and their quality of life are enhanced along with the City's economic development and to promote constructive relationships between Councillors and staff, local agencies and residents.

The VPP allows for each community to develop a village plan after consultation with its residents that sets out their issues of importance and specific goals to be achieved, such as improving street safety or developing a park, then, in partnership with dedicated Council officers and other project partners, residents complete the goals, including developing and approving designs and assisting with planting and construction.

Various methods of communicating ongoing progress of the VPP and individual village projects are employed, including regular meetings with Council staff and community representatives, a quarterly e-newsletter, dedicated VPP Council website updated weekly and quarterly reporting of VPP progress to Council. Community groups share their expertise and experiences with other resident associations involved in the programme through local newsletters and websites.

Outcomes

In 2010, Porirua won three gold standard awards in the International Liveable Communities Awards, a UK-based organisation, recognised by the United

Nations Environment Program, with the stated objective of developing and sharing "International Best Practice regarding management of the local environment" and "improving the quality of life of individual citizens through the creation of liveable communities" (<http://www.livcomawards.com/index.htm>). Porirua was recognised as a world leader in the way it works as a city, from all levels of government to business and community groups and individual residents for the benefits of the people who live there and the environment.

In particular, Porirua's VPP was recognised as the best example of a world leading socioeconomic project in its ability to "engage and empower the residents in each sector of the city to develop and implement plans in their own way to reflect the distinct identity of each village", and further, that it "is a ground-breaking partnership between the City council and the communities it serves" (<http://www.livcomawards.com/2011-awards/documents/Livcom11pr4.pdf>).

Overall, the Council reported a noticeable increase in community pride and a deeper relationship between the Council and its communities. The residents also reported very positive attitudes towards the VPP and the Council generally, one praising the council officers who made the first village plan work when there was no precedent to rely on, commenting that the "level of community consultation [involved in the VPP process] is time consuming and not the way council was used to operating", and that the residents "feel for the first time they have a voice" (*LG New Zealand*, www.localgovernmentmag.co.nz).

Specific benefits following the VPP reported by the residents of Porirua include:

- revitalised village centres, better pedestrian safety and improved community facilities and general amenity;
- increased community ownership and engagement with neighbourhood leaders;
- residents have a stronger voice and real sense of involvement in Council planning and decision making;
- public goodwill towards the Council's processes have increased;
- less submissions and complaints are made on contentious proposals; and,
- greater engagement now exists between outside agencies (such as government services) and the neighbourhoods they operate in.

The Council believes the VPP is unique in New Zealand in terms of being a true community/Council partnership. The Council's Social and Economic Policy Manager at the time commented that: "This is absolutely new. It is ground breaking and it is scary at times. It is not controlled by the methodology or fits within the protocols that have grown up around the way council has always treated its citizens of 'You give us the money. We'll spend it'. This is true partnership" (Moira Lawler, *Celebrating new ideas*, Project Submission Template, 2009 New Zealand Post Group Local Excellence Awards, available at <http://www.solgm.co.nz/NR/rdonlyres/3DEF2768-4D33-4F00-8DA5-4605901E5580/71966/CR05PoriruaCityCouncilVillagesPlanningProgramme.pdf>).

In addition, the Council has had to develop new ways of integrating Council work streams to manage the additional demands on Council staff arising out of the

VPP process, as well as tools to keep the process on track and communicate with community partners.

Critical success factors

The key factors determining the success of this program include:

- securing long-term funding (it was given a budget of \$6 million to be spent over 10 years);
- being able to set a clear strategic direction for the City as a whole while staying true to each community's unique characteristics; and,
- the capacity to break-down barriers between Councillors and staff, local agencies and residents and establish strong working relationships.

The States of Jersey¹⁰ Managing demographic change

Context and Opportunity

The Island of Jersey in the UK faces serious challenges in the years to come because of its ageing population. The Government of Jersey (States of Jersey) has difficult decisions to make balancing tax rates, public services and pensions. These decisions could change life on Jersey dramatically, and it is therefore important that policies are informed by the public's views and supported by the community.

Response

The States of Jersey decided to run a large public engagement initiative with the purpose of raising the awareness and understanding among the general public of the challenges and tradeoffs facing the States of Jersey. This would help the States of Jersey in turn to understand the public's views and preferences on these issues. The States of Jersey commissioned Involve to design a process which was tailored to the specific situation in Jersey and which built the skills of the government. The consultation combined two deliberative conferences (one for citizens of mixed ages and one for young people), an online survey, and a written consultation. Involve recorded and analysed the results of each of these elements and produced a final report of the findings.

At the conferences, participants watched presentations on the ageing society, some possible policy choices and then discussed the issues in small groups facilitated by trained State officials. After the discussions participants used electronic voting pads to vote on pre-agreed questions. In the cases where participants were unhappy about the wording of the questions these were clarified or changed accordingly on the spot. At the conference, participants were given cards with different policy options showing how much money each option

10. This case study has been Peer reviewed as part of Involve's UK project on local government innovation in response to economic crisis. See a more detailed exposition of these case studies at: <http://www.involve.org.uk/>.

would generate or save. Each group had to choose a combination of policies to address the projected annual deficit for 2035. This encouraged participants to consider the options as part of the wider whole and recognise the tradeoffs involved. As part of the preparations Involve ran a one day training session on public engagement and facilitation. This built-up the skills of States of Jersey staff to organise and run future consultations.

Outcomes

The event changed the political climate, allowing the States of Jersey to gain a much clearer understanding of which options the public would support, which they would accept, and which they would oppose. The process also enabled the States of Jersey to design future engagement initiatives and facilitate discussion with citizens.

Critical success factors

In this case, the role of the knowledge institution (Involve) in designing, facilitating and managing the deliberation was crucial to the outcome. It took a courageous Council to admit that they needed help in this regard. The local authority should benefit from capacity development in the theory and methodology of community engagement in future years. However, the local government also benefitted from a favourable policy environment for radical engagement with the citizenry. The onset of profound economic crisis combined with worrying demographic trends provided fertile ground for an effective engagement.

2. Product Innovation

Product innovation involves the development of new local government products which have a commercial or private value and are often associated with the development, use and adaptation of relevant technologies.

Wetland technologies in the City of Salisbury Safeguarding sustainable environmental futures

Context and Opportunity

Despite enough rain falling on Adelaide over winter to satisfy its annual water consumption, for decades access to cheap, clean water remained one of the most critical issues facing South Australia. Furthermore, for years South Australia spent millions of tax dollars on piping water from the River Murray, with dramatic environmental costs while piping stormwater and sewerage to the coast, where it poisoned the marine environment.

Response

The City of Salisbury to Adelaide's north has addressed these environmental problems in an innovative way through the exploitation of its access to natural water sources. Salisbury lies on a flood plain which was marshy in its pre-

settlement state. After Salisbury Council created a wetland recreational asset – The Paddocks – in the late 1960s, it was observed that as well as attracting wildlife the huge natural filter also cleaned pollutants out of inflowing stormwater within a few days. In response to the City’s huge irrigation costs in 1993-4, engineers sought a way to store large volumes of water cheaply. The first experimental Aquifer Recharge Bore was trialled in The Paddocks in 1994 with dramatic results: “these trials were very successful, and proved that the aquifer can be readily used to store large volumes of water for subsequent reuse,” a City of Salisbury summary states.

Outcomes

The City of Salisbury is now recognised as a world leader in the field of wetlands technology, with over 30 wetlands totalling approximately 250 hectares in area and costing in excess of \$16 million. Stormwater – traditionally regarded as a problem, and in some cases a threat – is now a source of significant local government revenue. This investment in the development of technical capacity in wetlands technology has led to innovations in other water technologies. For example, the Aquifer Storage Transfer and Recovery (ASTR) technique is a process for converting stormwater into water of drinkable quality was successfully trialled from 2006 to 9. The technique involves injecting stormwater, which was treated by being passed through a reed bed or wetland, into an aquifer. The water, stored in darkened conditions for a prolonged period, becomes drinkable through natural processes. The ASTR project is supported by the Australian Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research (DIISR), the South Australian Premier’s Science and Research Foundation and the National Water Commission. Water quality facts and system operation regarding the Parafield stormwater harvesting system was provided by the City of Salisbury.

Critical success factors

In this case, courageous leadership exercised by Salisbury’s CEO played a pivotal role in seeing the innovation through from idea to implementation – “Too many CEOs get bogged down in believing they are hopeless pawns in a political game dominated by the Commonwealth and States. They spend too much time second guessing other government agendas rather than setting the agenda themselves. The fact is if you have a good idea the funding will follow. It is easier to do this in local government”. In addition, possessing the expertise necessary within the organisation [or having access to it] to engage in innovation in a highly technical complex area was also crucial.

Banking on Essex *Investing in small local businesses*

Context and Opportunity

The economic downturn in the UK has affected people in numerous ways. Loss of access to credit has placed a huge strain on individuals and on small businesses. In Essex, the reduced availability of loans and capital is especially problematic

due to its large proportion of small businesses and self-employed people. Essex has also noted the concern of small businesses about the increasingly complex and difficult to access business support that is available.

Response

Essex decided to take innovative measures and started the 'Banking on Essex' initiative. 'Banking on Essex' provides credit as well as business support to small businesses, not only for the short term but also to help them to plan beyond the recession. The Bank is using £50 million of its own money as well acting as an intermediary to deliver European Investment Bank funds. Loans of up to £100,000 will be made available to eligible, viable small businesses in the county. Many of the problems caused by the current economic crisis can be traced to the corporate model of banking. 'Banking on Essex' aims to base itself upon a more traditional model, focused on lower risks and on providing support to prevent business closures. In this way, unemployment can also be reduced by keeping businesses afloat. In addition, Essex has set up a scheme to provide apprentices to small businesses. Not only will this help small companies, but providing people who are out of work with training will be crucial in growing and retaining skills in the workforce.

Outcomes

Though 'Banking on Essex' seems to be responding to purely economic issues, the implications for citizen empowerment cannot be underestimated. Creating a bank that is focused on local needs, personal contact and support of customers can not only help boost small businesses through turbulent times, but restore some faith in the banking sector, as well as in the council. Essex is aiming to respond to community needs whilst helping to build capacity and resilience in local people to survive the economic downturn.

Critical success factors

The onset of profound economic crisis once again provided fertile ground for innovation. However, it took a courageous Council to take these steps. The political dividends are potentially significant: the Council is seen to be making attempts to stabilise the local economy through lending support to local businesses in times of crisis with the added benefits of maintaining employment levels and restoring faith in government.

3. Service Innovation

Service innovation involves the production of new services which have public rather than private value and sometimes drawing on the development, use and adaptation of relevant technologies.

Brewarrina Mobile Dental Services

Context and Opportunity

Brewarrina is a remote community in New South Wales with a predominantly Indigenous population. Prior to the introduction of the Brewarrina Rural and Remote Dental Project, the community had been without dental services for five years.

Response

In December 2006, Brewarrina Shire Council approached Griffith University to develop a Rural Placement Dental Program that would host final year dental students undertaking practical experience in the town of Brewarrina. The community was consulted and a partnership between Brewarrina Shire Council, Griffith University, Ochre Health and Greater Western Area Health Service (GWAHS) was formed to deliver the Brewarrina Rural and Remote Dental Project. Not only does the project provide a health service for Brewarrina that has not existed for five years, it also benefits all of rural Australia by providing dental students with a valuable opportunity to experience rural life in a remote town. These placements show Gold Coast based students that living and working in a rural locality can be a rewarding experience and will hopefully lead to some of these students considering starting their careers in rural Australia.

Most students report that being involved in this program was a positive experience and invaluable to their understanding of the specific needs involved in a rural area. Some students have indicated that they are now looking to move to a rural community after graduation.

In early February 2009, a dental surgery was built using capital funding. The facility contains four dental clinics which enables four dental chairs to be operating concurrently. This allows for families who have to travel to be booked together. Groups of up to eight Griffith University dental students, accompanied by a qualified dental supervisor visit Brewarrina for blocks of three weeks at a time.

The service is free for children under 18 years and holders of Australian Health Care Cards. A partnership with the Greater Western Area Health Service also makes dental treatment of approximately 70 per cent of Brewarrina residents free. The service aims to improve oral health education among children, improve affordable access to oral health care and reduce cases of secondary illnesses caused by poor oral hygiene that are prevalent in many communities.

Outcomes

Since commencing in February 2009 over 700 patients have received treatment

and 1,300 appointments have been attended. Children and Australian health card holders receive free treatment. The Shire benefits from improved health, reduced retail leakage and attraction of people to Brewarrina as well as an injection of funds to the local community. The project ran for 21 weeks in 2009 and will run for 24 weeks in 2010 and for 30 weeks in 2011. The clinic opens Monday to Friday and provides services for between 25 and 30 patients a day. The project is funded \$124K per annum for operational expenses but due to its innovatory character it has attracted a range of funding sources to provide for remote client transport, mobile dental equipment, and the use of state of the art dental equipment (mobile x-ray). The partnership has also provided for educational outreach to school students, shire towns and villages. Since the inception of the program the practice has conducted over 3,000 appointments and received no patient complaints.

Critical success factors

This is unique project in Australia mainly because the provision of oral health care would not normally be viewed as core council business. The capacity of the Shire Council to see a partnering opportunity which would be a 'win-win' for both organisations took considerable foresight. Once the partnership had been established, access to highly skilled and respected practitioners and health professionals made the program sustainable. This is a telling example of a Council searching to create and deliver public value outside of its normal organisational boundaries. It took courage and a leap of faith but has proved an important innovation which has enhanced the wellbeing of the community.

Whanau Ora ('Community wellbeing') place based service delivery

Context and Opportunity

In Maori, Whanau Ora refers to 'Family or community wellbeing'. The Prime Minister of New Zealand John Key set up a Whanau Ora taskforce on 14th June 2009 to evaluate how the indigenous gap between Maori and non-Maori could be addressed. The specific task of the taskforce was "to develop a policy framework for a new method of government interaction with Maori service providers to meet the social service needs of Whanau".

In its report, published on 8 April 2010, the taskforce made five core recommendations: a) it recognised the need for tailored services for the Maori community; b) it identified the need for a joined-up approach to service delivery through which multi-agency activities would be delivered through one agency selected and funded through a regional panel; c) it argued that money currently spent on health, education, justice and social development on Whanau Ora would be diverted into a Whanau Ora program; d) the focus of the program would be on early intervention; and, e) while the policy would be aimed at Maori "it will be available to all families in need".

In general, the other main parties supported the recommendations. Reservations were expressed regarding the need for additional funding. As Green Party Co-Leader Metiria Turei put it, "Whanau Ora won't work unless there is new money put in to it. The Government cannot ask the already deeply stretched social

service sector to do more with the same or less money, it just won't work". Further concerns were articulated regarding money being spent on establishing new bureaucracy rather than on solving Maori problems. The Maori community itself is sceptical at yet another costly initiative being conceived without sufficient consultation with communities. Finally, there is some pessimism within the public service at its capacity to deliver joined-up placed based solutions to Maori problems.

The Whanau Ora taskforce gives one example of how the new welfare policy might work. It describes a single mother in part-time employment who is finding it difficult to make ends meet and who has lost contact with her extended family. She has three children:

- a 16 year old son who has been caught repeatedly driving without a licence and has stopped going to work because he is scared of telling his boss about his offending;
- a 12 year old daughter who has been referred to the Strengthening Families program because of repeated absences from schools; and,
- an eight year old son who has been picked up roaming the streets at night and returned to a home with no adult present, which has led to a referral to Child, Youth and Family services.

The Mother is working mornings and nights meaning she has to rely on the older children to look after the youngest and she is unaware that her daughter is being bullied at school.

In this case, the Mother is dealing with the Police, Work and Income services, Child, Youth and Family services, schools, and, the Strengthening Families program. The Taskforce has stated that the Whanau Ora policy would result in one provider dealing with the family in an open and frank way.

Response

Whanau Ora has been constituted as a Whanau-centred governance structure for collaborative integrated service delivery in a way that wraps appropriate services around the family unit. Whanau decide on the nature of those services and who provides them. Regional leadership groups have been created based on Te Puni Kokiri boundaries. Their role is to provide regional strategic leadership to ensure that whanau-centred initiatives that reinforce community goals and values are established. Members include community representatives from each Te Puni Kokiri, the Ministry of Social Development and local District Health Boards. 25 provider collectives involving 158 health and social service providers have begun to deliver the program.

Outcomes

This program is in its infancy and its development has been adversely impacted by the Global Financial Crisis. Not least because it had its original budget slashed back from \$1billion to \$134million. Thus far \$164 million has been invested in the Whanau Ora program and it has been rolled out country-wide. The first stage of the program has involved creating governance structures (Regional

Leadership Groups), developing planning and priority-setting processes and identifying providers.

Critical success factors

Hitherto, the importance of the Whanau Ora program lies not in its program outcomes but in the establishment of deep core beliefs with regard to the normative principles to be applied to Whanau social exclusion issues. These are reflected in three principles of engagement – the emerging belief in the policy sub system of the illegitimacy of top-down ‘government-knows best’ programs; participatory democracy; and, community program ownership. At the policy core certain policy positions are emerging for attaining these core values: community-driven development; indigenous organisations as sovereign; use of indigenous NGOs for managing delivery; and, facilitating partners for building capacity. Political will, majority government and national solidarity on the issue of Te Puni Kokira.

Service Priority-setting in York *determining public value*

Context and opportunity

Dealing with the recession has been difficult for councils across the UK, due to rising unemployment and much tighter public budgets. The City of York, like other councils, has had to deal with these pressures and adapt involvement methods to engage more effectively with communities over financial concerns and stabilise the community to work constructively in the current economic climate.

Response

The City of York Council has taken the approach that the empowerment agenda is intrinsically linked with helping local citizens get through the economic downturn. By working in wards and using participatory budgeting, York has shown that using tools that are already available is often a successful way to efficiently involve and empower citizens during difficult economic times. There are 18 Ward Committees in York; each holds meetings at least four times per year, where people can discuss local issues and propose solutions. In addition, each Ward Committee has a devolved local budget, and local people can influence its spending. A specific response to the recent economic situation is the introduction of ‘credit crunch surgeries’ as a topic for Ward Committee meetings. These help local residents deal with financial problems they might be having. Participatory budgeting (PB) has proven a particularly useful tool in coping with decreased resources while also engaging citizens in local decision-making. York has a long history of using a system of devolved budgets, and was announced as one of the Government’s latest round of PB pilots. The process begins with local households being given lists of suggestions for budget spending, and residents are invited to ward committee meetings to prioritise their choices. Not only is this an effective way to allocate scarce resources, but it involves citizens in a proactive way and empowers them to be active in their community. Each ward also produces newsletters called ‘Your Ward’, featuring content such as

volunteering opportunities, credit crunch surgeries and other suggestions to help people through the recession. The results from participatory budgeting are published in these newsletters so that local residents are informed and can feel like they could make a difference in the spending of scarce public money.

Outcomes

In summary, York has taken a 'business as usual' approach to dealing with the recession. With involvement of citizens already built into the agenda of ward committee meetings and participatory budgeting. The only change necessary was to be resourceful, and slightly adapt the agenda to suits local people's needs and concerns.

Critical success factors

In this context, a history of innovation in participatory budgetary methods (though at a limited scale in terms of the size of resource) provided a strong technical capacity for scaling up to a more radical course of action. Hence the creation of an innovation system led to the proliferation of new forms of policy learning.

4. Governance innovations

Governance innovations involve new or altered ways of solving implementation tasks with other sectors and knowledge bases, delivering services or otherwise interacting with clients for the purpose of supplying specific services.

ACT-Anglicare-Northside 'Home to Work' Program

Context and opportunity

In 2011 there remains small groups of citizens, spread throughout most communities in Canberra who are living deeply challenging lives. This is a consequence of a historical decision by the City's founders to spread public housing across communities rather than concentrate it in specific areas.

These citizens share our communities, our aspirations, our own daily lives. Some are trapped in a spiral of drugs, homelessness, poor mental health and crime. But in the most part they are the victims of poor life choices, or personal crises brought on by sexual or physical abuse, bereavement, loss of employment or poor health. There is also a growing number of immigrants escaping religious or political persecution who are structured as outsiders from the moment they join our communities.

Despite government emphasis on the importance of combating social exclusion and indeed improved results in tackling wider forms of social exclusion such as homelessness, gains in helping this highly visible section of citizens who experience multiple needs and exclusions have been at best superficial.

Response

Home to Work is a pilot project designed to improve coordination and integration between support and employment services for some of the most disadvantaged job seekers in Canberra: that is, public housing tenants in the inner-north postcode 2612. The project aims to enhance community engagement and connection for tenants in addition to improving opportunities to participate in community activities, programs, training and work.

Home to Work is funded through the Australian Government's Innovation Fund. The funding application was developed and submitted by the ACT Government (through the Chief Minister's Department and the Department of Disability, Housing and Community Services). The Innovation Fund was established by the Australian Government to address the needs of the most disadvantaged job seekers by trialing innovative place based projects to overcome barriers to employment.

Effective responses to long term unemployment require collaboration across the Commonwealth and Territory Governments and with non-government organisations (and these sectors are all represented on the project's Governance Group). The project aims to ensure that Commonwealth funded services (Job Service Australia and Disability Employment Network providers and Centrelink for example) and ACT funded services (including public housing, crisis and support services) work together to minimise what public housing tenants have called the 'service run-around' and to optimise their opportunities.

The project is place-based and located in the 2612 postcode (which includes the inner-north suburbs of Reid, Braddon and Turner) because of the relatively high levels of socio-economic disadvantage and long-term unemployment. The postcode also has concentrations of multi-unit public housing.

The project is delivered by three brokers – Anglicare, ACT Housing and Northside Community Services – but managed by Anglicare Canberra and Goulburn in a principal-agent relationship. The aim here is to wrap a range of appropriate services around the citizen to facilitate integration over time into the labour market. While the three brokers will develop relationships important working relationships with the citizen, the key relationship (as far as the citizen is concerned) is with the Northside Community Services case worker.

Outcomes

Specific activities undertaken by Brokers include, but are not limited to: advocacy and mentoring; 'one on one' support meetings with participants; support to complete housing applications; court and bail condition support; job search and preparedness support; emergency relief brokerage; family and extended family support; facilitation of access to special Centrelink payments; assistance to travel interstate for funerals and to visit ill relatives; coordination and payment of bills related to work placement; referral to specialist support services including Legal Aid and mental health services; and, Home and Community Care Assessments.

This project has been enormously successful both in combating social exclusion and in delivering employment opportunities. Key outcomes through social capital bridge-building includes: a reduction in anti-social behaviour as illustrated by improved social interactions of participants with the broader community in the 2612 postcode; regular participation in personal development activities such as art groups; engagement in social activities such as community barbecues and walks; completion of training such as First Aid certification, Forklift licensing and certificates in Information Technology; participant engagement with Job Service Australia and Disability Employment Service providers; participation in English language courses; skills development through work experience, identification of employment goals and, engagement in casual, part time and full time employment.

The project also accepts that the measurement of project success needs to be calculated from the perspective of the journeys of individual citizens. For example, Citizen X has a background of mental and physical abuse and has been structured as an outsider from childhood. He is experiencing barriers to inclusion in terms of psychological pain and low self-esteem resulting in personality disorders and social exclusion. Citizen X is highly intelligent, possesses key skills and has a clear sense of entitlement. His future is contingent on effective coordination of a staged approach to permanent full time employment and to a more stable and contented life. In short, a successful outcome for this citizen is contingent on effective management of various transitions from unemployment to part-time employment to full-time employment to long-term employment underpinned by success in managing mental illness. In overview, the indices of success in this case are that the citizen is work ready, holding down a part time position, and has heightened confidence making for better mental health.

Critical success factors

H2W is innovative because:

- unlike other Innovation Fund Projects, the H2W project partners directly with the ACT Government and builds on existing client relationships with Housing ACT tenants to provide a continuity of service provision. This project also builds on existing funding relationships and networks between the ACT Government and community services providers to facilitate the involvement of support providers in the project.
- It is also notable that the project is managed by Anglicare Canberra and Goulburn in a principal-agent relationship – this is unique in the Australian context.
- As the owner of asset, Housing ACT also has capacity to manage the physical environment in which services will be provided and will also be able to explore employment avenues for tenants via its subcontractor base through the use of social procurement activities.
- The project integrates skills development, training and work with the provision of crisis and support services for some of the most disadvantaged individuals in the ACT; a population that has been largely disengaged from the labour market.
- It is using the secure tenure provided by social housing as a key intervention point to support social and economic participation (which will capture people recently exiting homelessness, long term unemployed, lone

parent households, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders and members of the CALD community).

It is also noted that cost effective, local and personal services for individuals facing the challenge of multiple needs requires:

- careful management of the case work pressure points (wrapping support systems around the case worker, succession planning);
- integrating key governance partners (e.g. JSAs, advocacy groups, volunteer organisations) into the delivery system;
- cost effective, local and personal services for individuals facing the challenge of multiple needs requires;
- moving towards a co-design model linked to enhancements in skills mapping for participants; and,
- finding the right places for delivery – i.e., local institutions that work for the different groups (this often means thinking beyond a postcode).

Waikato Lass and Boplass Shared Services

Context and opportunity

This is the story of the attempt by two regions to share services. Each area had been exploring the potential of shared services, primarily through jointly-owned shared services companies, constituted under New Zealand local government legislation as a 'council controlled organisation.' Waikato had established the Waikato Local Authority Shared Services Ltd (LASS) and the Bay of Plenty later formed the Bay of Plenty Local Shared Services Ltd (BOPLASS).

The Waikato region and the Bay of Plenty region are situated on the north island of New Zealand. The Waikato region comprises one regional council, one city council, nine district councils wholly within the region and two district councils partly within the region. The Bay of Plenty region, immediately to the east of Waikato, comprises one regional council, one city council, four district councils wholly within the region, one district council largely within and one district only partially within the region.

Within each region there had been some experience of *ad hoc* arrangements between two or more local authorities. Waikato had recognised the potential advantages of having a shared valuation database coupled with the potential for establishing contestability in the purchase of valuation services. Bay of Plenty had a history of providing IT support for smaller district councils in its region, and in both regions there had been some cooperation in the provision of specialist building services. In both cases, however, there was an understanding that member councils were not obliged to take part in every shared service.

However, both regions developed separate models of governance and organisation to progress the development of shared services. Both models had some advantages and some successes and both provide valuable lessons for other councils wishing to pursue policies of shared services.

Responses

Waikato LASS

Waikato LASS was established a year before BOPLASS. A critical factor for Waikato was the close personal relationship and goodwill between three key chief executives in the region, those of Hamilton City, the Regional Council and Waikato District Council. The choice of organisational structure was left to the region's CEOs, as the shared services initiative was seen primarily as a responsibility for CEOs consistent with their remit to deliver council services. Board membership was restricted to six directors with two directors representing just one local authority, one representing two authorities, and three each representing three.

There were some successes. In addition to developing a shared valuation database, Waikato LASS promoted the development of a single transport model for the region, with the LASS providing a convenient umbrella for its establishment. According to senior staff, the Waikato transport model appears to be performing effectively and efficiently as planned, with Waikato LASS providing a minimal governance structure for those services. Joint procurement has been successful in delivering very worthwhile savings for Waikato LASS.

From the outset, however, there were difficulties with governance, especially in relation to the operations of the Board. An obvious advantage of having a small-sized Board was the ease with which the Board could be brought together for meetings. However, it proved inadequate in providing a mandate for decisions as many Board members needed to refer possible decisions to constituent councils for advice. The Board also complained that they did not receive financial statements in a timely manner, resulting in it being unaware of budget over runs. Financial issues seriously undermined its credibility with shareholders.

Difficulties were compounded by changes in key personnel and workloads in the two largest councils, Hamilton City and the Regional Council. Both CEOs had played a major role in the initial establishment of Waikato LASS but Hamilton City's new CEO took a very different approach from his predecessor. The new CEO at the Regional Council had to deal with significant governance changes and major funding issues. Consequently, he preferred the council to design services and offer other councils the opportunity of participating, rather than proceeding through a formal shared services process requiring all councils to agree.

These changes in management approach have reduced individual council support for shared services and have resulted in the initiative stalling. Although some shared services activity continues in the region, it is typically outside the purview of Waikato LASS, being developed amongst groups of councils rather than by the region as a whole.

BOPLASS

In the case of BOPLASS a number of factors were significant in establishing shared services throughout the region. There was an interest in retaining local identity including a decision by two CEOs that radical collaboration was an

essential element in protecting local governance. This was coupled with a recognition that a successful shared services strategy needed to be much more than an anti-amalgamation strategy, amalgamation being very much the 'elephant in the room'.

Bay of Plenty also had a recent history of successful collaboration with four councils establishing a common library catalogue and a joint contract under which some councils were purchasing aerial photography services, a contract that was about to expire. And of course, the recent establishment of Waikato LASS provided a ready model on which to draw, generally an advantage in not being an early adopter!

The Bay of Plenty region was aware of the difficulties encountered by Waikato LASS with the structure of their administration and made one crucial change having all councils represented on the board, arguing that it was essential to have all the decision makers around the table.

Taking the 'low hanging fruit' approach, BOPLASS sought early successes in joint purchasing of items such as stationery, computer software, aerial photography and insurance resulting in significant savings to individual councils. These successes gave the member councils confidence that the shared services approach did have considerable potential for all member councils.

A turning point for the Bay of Plenty was central government interest in encouraging the development of regional broadband initiatives. BOPLASS established a subsidiary company to explore the potential of a high-speed fibre-optic network linking all the councils in the region. This program was subsequently rolled out with a current capacity of 1GB per second (with the potential to increase to 5GB). The program has proved to be the enabler of further developments in shared services by providing the means for any council to access data held by other councils.

As a result of the success of this venture BOPLASS and its member councils are now considering the establishment of a 'centres of excellence' approach to further shared services. Under this approach one council may become the base for other councils in for example, GIS or human resources or payroll or debtors control or any other service that is essentially a matter of receiving, processing and accessing information.

Difficulties faced by BOPLASS are typically based around the establishment of good governance practices: the recognition that values and policies can be difficult to harmonise, difference in operating styles, communication of board decisions to responsible managers in individual councils and the engagement of elected members in the whole process.

There have also been concerns about resourcing. In particular, conventional company reporting for BOPLASS does not capture the full costs and benefits, such as the opportunity costs incurred by involvement of CEOs as directors of BOPLASS. Because savings accrue to individual councils it can also be difficult for BOPLASS to demonstrate the full value it has added.

In both Waikato LASS and BOPLASS there have been concerns about securing buy-in from staff. In the case of BOPLASS, these fears about job losses have been compounded by the centres of excellence approach. However, senior staff have tried to reassure other staff by arguing that jobs will remain within councils although in time there will be a concentration of different skills in different councils which should create more career opportunities across the region.

The establishment of the high-speed fibre optic network at BOPLASS has set a platform for significantly increased collaboration. Some agendas for further capacity to share services include water and sewerage and spatial planning especially as possible centres of excellence. Significant levels of trust are building between the different councils in the Bay of Plenty region with CEOs meeting together every six weeks and councils hosting meetings with staff from different councils with staff comfortably using the other councils' IT facilities.

Outcomes

These two cases are instructive in that different approaches have yielded quite different outcomes. There are lessons to be learned that generally reflect the literature on change management. For example, the governance structure is crucial especially in ensuring that all major stakeholders are directly represented on the Board; building trust among participants is critical to developing confidence; and other important factors include starting small, gaining some early successes and ensuring clear and accurate reporting of financial matters.

The cases also reflect the importance of leadership: CEOs need to lead the process with commitment and clear communication to all involved of full costs and benefits. The success of Waikato LASS' shared valuation database initiative was not in reducing costs, rather by holding costs below where they would otherwise have been, but this was not always understood.

There is a fundamental difference between shared services expressed as a single provider selling services to other councils and shared services as a means of facilitating different councils to develop specialist functions and capacities that they can then provide to other councils. The emerging centres of excellence model in the Bay of Plenty region actually reinforces the autonomy and capability of smaller councils and strengthens local governance.

Conceptualising 'shared services' as fundamentally an exercise in information management is a major breakthrough. It opens up the potential for each service for which a council is responsible to be managed and delivered so as to optimise economies of scale and scope without the need for the potentially disruptive approaches that are likely to accompany amalgamation.

Critical success factors

The following factors were critically to achieving positive outcomes: inclusive governance arrangements; building trust and confidence among participants especially through engineering early successes; understanding the differences between shared services models where one council is a single provider of services for others, and the model where different councils develop specialisations which they can then 'export' to others (the centres of excellence

approach); conceptualising shared services as an exercise in information management at BOPLASS obviates the need for more intensive forms of consolidation such as amalgamation; Leadership, especially in securing staff buy-in.

Salford City Council Neighbourhood Renewal Program¹¹

Context and Opportunity

During a recession, social cohesion can be adversely affected by rising unemployment and increased tension in communities. In Salford, neighbourhood management has proven an effective way to empower local people; increasing their abilities to react and adapt to difficult financial circumstances.

Response

Salford is comprised of eight neighbourhoods, each of which has a neighbourhood management team attending to their particular needs and issues. By working with partners such as the police, community groups and PCTs, neighbourhood management teams help determine which priorities local people have, and budgets are allocated accordingly. Neighbourhood management is also a way to make sure that local people are involved in the decisions that affect them directly, including local services and community safety. Each neighbourhood has a Community Committee, providing residents' forums for local people to voice their concerns and priorities.

Outcomes

This way of responding to local issues and listening to peoples' needs has been particularly well suited to helping local people in Salford respond to the economic crisis. Devolved budgets, enabling local people to make decisions through participatory budgeting, have allowed Salford's neighbourhoods to make the most of decreased resources. Neighbourhood managers also are able to harness other resources, such as local skills, in order to organise events or supporting allotments. These activities are crucial in promoting cohesive communities.

Through a programme called Spotlight, Salford has helped to mainstream community regeneration by choosing an important issue in each neighbourhood and focussing the Neighbourhood Management team's efforts on it in every area of policy. This has brought problems, particularly unemployment, into clearer view and has enabled Neighbourhood Management teams to better pinpoint causes and solutions. Salford Neighbourhood Management has begun to tackle unemployment by recognising and highlighting opportunities in communities and by taking a whole systems approach; focussing on getting both newly and long-term unemployed back into work.

11. This case study forms part of Involve's project on innovation in response to economic crisis. See a more detailed exposition of these case studies at: <http://www.involve.org.uk/>.

Critical success factors

This case demonstrates the importance of the maxim – *never let a good crisis go to waste*. Neighbourhood management has proved a useful tool for service priority-setting and targeting need directly but most significantly it has enabled the Council to maintain a cohesive relationship with its community in times of crisis.

v. Practical lessons from the case studies

At least eight key lessons or ingredients of public value innovation can be drawn from these case studies.

- The capacity to spot gaps in service provision, or methods of delivery is essential for public service innovation to take place.
- The ability to forge strong partnerships with organisations across traditional organisational boundaries (voluntary, private sector or knowledge institutions) that possess resources (knowledge, finance, political or social capital) that are integral to the production of good community outcomes is a key feature of our sample of innovations.
- This must be combined with an ability to act, that is, either through a clear legislative framework or a program design which empowers actors to be creative in implementing the policy. This also means making use of the right political circumstances when they present themselves.
- A condition of successful innovation is often the existence of a needy political leader with a reform agenda to spearhead innovation.
- Support from political leaders or senior management is essential for the successful introduction of innovative policies, services or ideas.
- Genuine cross-departmental or cross-service collaboration facilitates the introduction of innovative services, especially when combined with effective communication between all levels of delivery.
- Engagement with citizens on the ground through place – be it at the local or sub-local level – in order to tailor service provision to their needs has been shown to be effective for the introduction of innovative services.
- New technologies can both spark innovations and support their successful implementation.¹²

Public value innovation therefore requires the adoption of at least four public value management principles:

Proposition 1: the role of public organizations at all levels should be circumscribed by the search for public value and a commitment to a public service ethos.

Proposition 2: decision centres in governance structures should include a balance of forces (public service panels, political representatives, technical support).

Proposition 3: public managers should be neutral facilitators of public value.

Proposition 4: governance structures should use a participatory learning-based approach to the challenge of service deliver i.e. they should integrate a citizen-centric approach into the workplan of the organisation.

12. See: Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA) (2005), *Innovation in Public Services*, <http://www.idea.gov.uk/idk/aio/1118552> (accessed 3 February 2010), for a range of other factors.

These principles would help to bring the politics back into policy deliberation and operational delivery at a time when the public standing of governmental institutions has reached a nadir. They would help to foster problem-solving, reflexive public organisations committed to delivering public value.

The application of these principles would have dramatic practical implications for the work plans of local governments. However, they are very much in alignment with the drivers and thematic priorities of public sector reform. Five public value practices would be particularly important for governance:

Proposition 1: public managers need to understand the network environment through scoping the field of action, identifying all potential partners and their resources.


Proposition 2: public managers need to develop 'smart partnerships' through policy community-building with key stakeholders.

Proposition 3: determining public value will require the integration of new engagement methods in which public managers should establish clear deliberative rules and intelligent performance indicators linked directly to negotiated policy objectives with elected members.

Proposition 4: Monitoring systems should be designed to identify movements towards or away from achieving these objectives.

Proposition 5: Work plans should be subject to annual audits and evaluations with effective reporting systems both to politicians and to the public.

VI. What are the major barriers to public value innovation?¹³



"That's how seriously we take improvement around here."

Our three focus groups with senior local government managers in Western Australia, New South Wales and the ACT were asked to identify the major barriers to innovation in their organisations. These can be clustered around conceptual barriers, dysfunctional institutional norms and values, and political support mechanisms.

Conceptual barriers

These obstacles refer to staff understanding innovation 'as a diversion from real work', or 'extra work' or 'risky work'. Concern was also raised over whether local government had access to the knowledge base both within and without the organisation that they needed to innovate. Moreover, local government leaders were poor at communicating the benefits of innovation to their staff and elected members.

Dysfunctional institutional norms and values

It is observed that many dysfunctional institutional norms and values persist in local government. These include:

13. These are similar reasons for why governments find it so hard to be strategic!

- the tendency for the absence of a common vision of change across the administrative and political elite;
- the persistence of a culture of risk aversion;
- organizations that are not receptive to the development of new ideas;
- a physical working environment which is not conducive to the development of ideas;
- short-term budgets and planning horizons;
- delivery pressures and administrative burdens;
- poor rewards and incentives to innovate;
- poor skills in active risk or change management to create opportunity structures for innovation;
- reluctance to close down failing programs or services;¹⁴
- institutional constraints on the use of evidence in policy-making arising from the electoral cycle;
- inability to utilise existing capacity, learn from the front-line and share evidence of better practice;
- commitment and leadership skills of implementing officials;
- the existence of technological infrastructure and capacity; and,
- failure to attract and/or retain the best and the brightest.

Political support mechanisms

Political support mechanisms refer to environmental variables which can affect the capacity of local governments to engage in public sector innovation. Many of these are beyond the control of local government leaders such as the need for a crisis to facilitate change or stable socio-economic conditions. Others require effective community or stakeholder engagement to solicit public support and involvement, and manage and integrate the views and resources of constituency groups. Perhaps the critical dilemma to tackle in this area is the need to garner support from elected members and to understand innovation as a whole of local government and dare I say it, 'community' endeavour.

14. See Evans, 2009, Mulgan & Albury, 2003; Borins, 2004.

vii. How can these barriers be navigated?

The process of innovation is lengthy, interactive and social; many people with different talents, skills and resources have to come together.
Charles Leadbeater, 2009.

Our focus groups highlighted the importance of adopting following strategic response organised around principles of engagement, leading innovation and maintaining innovation.

Principles of engagement

1. Search for public value.
2. Every idea matters.
3. Innovation involves everybody.
4. Create interdisciplinary teams with effective disciplinary integration.
5. Stakeholder and citizen participation is important at all stages.
6. Experiment – question received wisdom and search widely for ideas.

Leading innovation

7. Mayors and CEOs must champion innovation from the top.
8. Innovation requires resources [e.g. ring fenced funding/internal/community award schemes].
9. Innovation champions should be formally identified and organised at all levels of the organisation.
10. Rewards must be invested in innovative individuals and teams.
11. To access knowledge develop high quality knowledge networks which encompass theory and practice and include governance partners.

Maintaining a culture of innovation

12. Design the workplace in a way that is conducive to the development of and incubation of new ideas.
13. Invest in research and development to identify, incubate, develop and trial new ideas.
14. Invest in innovation coaching and mentoring.
15. Develop regular lesson-drawing forums and other mediums for communicating success stories and identifying potential innovations.
16. Use monitoring and evaluation processes as an ongoing condition for effective learning.
17. Embrace cyclical external evaluations and other practices which allow for genuine professional reflection.

If you have any comments on this paper, please email them to mark.evans@canberra.edu.au .

References

- Aldridge, R. & Stoker, G. (2002), *Advancing a public service ethos*, London, New Local Government Network.
- Alford, J. and Hughes, O. (2008), 'Public value pragmatism as the next phase of public management', *The American Review of Public Administration*, 38, 2, 130-148.
- Amann, R. (2006), 'The circumlocution office: a snapshot of civil service reform', *Political Quarterly*, 77, 3, 334-359.
- ANZSOG (2007), *Enhancing ANZSOG's Contribution to Better Government: Future Research Directions*, Research Reference Group, Report to ANZSOG, October (http://anzsog-research.anu.edu.au/pdfs/ANZSOG_RRG_report.pfd).
- Balls, E. (2002), 'Devolution and localism in public policy – a view from the Treasury', Speech to the CIPFA annual conference, Brighton, 2002.
- Bichard, M. (2005), 'Why isn't public service reform delivering?' *Solace Foundation*, October 2005, 14-17.
- Blunkett, D. (2003a), 'Civil renewal: a new agenda for government', Edith Kahn memorial lecture, 11 June 2003.
- Blunkett, D. (2003b), 'Active citizens, strong communities: progressing civil renewal', Scarman lecture, 11 December 2003.
- Blunkett, D. (2004), 'Renewing democracy: why government should invest in civil renewal', Speech to the Ash Institute, 2004.
- Bovaird, T. & Russell, K., (2007), Civil service reform in the UK 1999-2005: revolutionary failure or evolutionary success? *Public administration*, 85, 2, 301-328.
- British Academy (2008), *Punching our weight: The Humanities and Social Sciences in Public Policy Making*, A British Academy Report, September.
- Cabinet Office [Performance and Innovation Unit, UK], (2002), 'Social capital: a discussion paper', London, Cabinet Office.
- Gill, C. and Kelly, L. (2005), *New Directions for knowledge transfer and knowledge brokerage in Scotland*, Office of Chief Researcher, Scottish Executive. Research Findings, No. 1, Scottish Executive Social Research and Briefing Paper, chapter 4. <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2005/09/2782919/29247>
- CHSRF (1999), "Issues in Linkage and Exchange between Researchers and Decision Makers" (www.chsrf.ca/knowledge_transfer/pdf/linkage_e.pdf).
- Council for Science and Technology (UK) (2008), *How Academia and Government can work together*, October.
- Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research (2009), *Innovation Powering Ideas: An Innovation Agenda for the 21st Century*, Commonwealth of Australia, May.
- Edwards, M. (2004), 'Social Science and Public Policy; narrowing the Divide', *Occasional Paper No.2*, Academy of Social Sciences, Canberra.
- Edwards, M. (2008), 'Participatory Governance', Issues Paper No.6, Corporate Governance ARC Project, University of Canberra, www.canberra.edu.au/corpgov-aps
- Edwards, M. (2009), 'In Search of Useful Research: Demand and Supply Challenges for Policy Makers', 21st World Congress of Political Science, Chile, July.
- ESRC (2009), http://www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/index_academic.aspx
- Evans, M. (2007), 'The Art of Prescription: Theory and Practice in Public Administration Research', *Public Policy and Administration*, 84, 2, 128-152.
- Evans, M. (2009a), 'A Project in Search of a Big Idea?' Gordon Brown and Public Services Management, in M. Beech and S. Lee, eds., *The Brown Effect*, special issue, *Policy Studies*, 30, 1, 33-52.
- Evans, M. (ed.), (2009b), *New Directions in the Study of Policy Transfer* (Oxford: Routledge/Taylor and Francis/Policy Studies).
- Fischer, F. (1993), Citizen participation and the democratization of policy expertise. *Policy Sciences*, 26, 3, 165-187.
- Fischer, F. (2003), *Reframing public policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Gains, F., & Stoker, G. (2009), 'Public value management in parliamentary democracies: possibilities and pitfalls', *Parliamentary Affairs*.
- GSRU (2009) http://www.gsr.gov.uk/about/gsr_governance/gov_gsr.asp
- Hood, C. (1995), Contemporary management, *Public Policy and administration*, 10, 2, 104-117.
- Howard J. (2008), 'Rigour and Relevance: Extending the Role of Social Sciences and Humanities in Public Policy Research', *CHASS Occasional Papers*, April.
- Kelly, G. & Muers, S. (2002), *Creating public value. An analytical framework for public service reform*. London: Cabinet Office Strategy Unit.
- Moore, M. (1995), *Creating public value*. Cambridge: Mass, Harvard.
- National Audit Office (2003), *Getting the Evidence: Using Research in Policy Making*, The Stationary Office, London, April.
- Nutley S. et al. (2007), *Using Evidence: How research can inform public services*, The Policy Press.
- Parkinson, J. (2004), Why deliberate? The encounter between deliberation and new public managers. *Public Administration*, 82, 2, 377-395.
- Pollitt, C. (2006), "Academic Advice to Practitioners – What is its Nature, Place and Value within Academia?", *Public Money and Management*, September, 257-264
- Putnam, R. D. (1995), 'Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital', *The Journal of Democracy*, 6, 1, 65-78.
- Raynsford, N. (2003), 'New localism: making a reality of the myth', Speech, 17 March 2003, Home Office.
- State Services Authority (2009), <http://www.ssa.vic.gov.au/CA2571410025903D/0/775D90581A06595DCA257452000A428A?OpenDocument>
- Stoker, G. (1998), *Governance as theory: five propositions*. UNESCO: Blackwell Publishers.
- Stoker, G. (2006), Public value management: a new narrative for networked governance? *American Review of Public Administration*, 36, 1, 41-47.
- Strategy Unit (2006), *The UK government's approach to public service reform*, London, Prime Minister's Strategy Unit. Available from: www.strategy.gov.uk/downloads/work_areas/public_service_reform/sj_report.pdf.
- Turnbull, A. (2002), *Cabinet office reform and delivery in the civil service. Note to the Chair of the public administration select committee*. Available from: <http://www.civilservant.org.uk/turnbull0602.pdf> [Accessed 14 September 2008].
- Rhodes, R.A.W. and Wanna, J. (2007), 'The limits to public value, or rescuing responsible government from the Platonic guardians', *The Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 66, 4, pp. 406-421.

Useful Websites

- ANU, Research and Innovation Policy Dialogue, <http://repp.anu.edu.au/ripp/public/> (accessed 3 February 2010).
- Centre for Social Innovation (NZ) – <http://www.nzcsi.org/tag/geoff-mulgan/> (accessed 3 February 2010).
- Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA) (2005), *Innovation in Public Services*, <http://www.idea.gov.uk/idk/aio/1118552> (accessed 3 February 2010).
- NESTA Making Innovations Flourish, <http://www.nesta.org.uk/home> (accessed 3 February 2010).